COMMENT
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
DELINEATION: THE
INTERCHANGEABILITY OF
STANDARDS IN CASES
ARISING UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT AND SECTION 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
The avowed purpose of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competition in open markets.' Injury to competition is not easily measured,
and in order to assess the harmful effects of a particular practice the
courts make several determinations. These commonly include the market structure and the actual or potential market power of the business
in question. 2 The significance of these particular determinations is nowhere more apparent than in cases brought under the antimonopoly
provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act 3 and the antimerger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 In a case arising under either
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
4293 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 17751;
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1191];
Upshaw, The Relevant Market in Merger Decisions: Antitrust Concept or Antitrust Device?, 60
Nw. U.L. REV. 424 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Upshaw].
1. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1955). But cf. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POL-

ICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (questioning the viability of the promotion-of-competition purpose and suggesting that the exclusive goal be that of maximizing consumer welfare).
2. II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION

500, at 321 (1978).

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if
a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
3.

1152

Vol. 1979:1152]

GEOGRA4PHIC MA=RKT DELINEATION

1153

statute, market structure can be determined without too much trouble;
however, a direct determination of market power is much more difficult.5 Consequently, the courts have created the concept of "relevant
markets, ' 6 and use market share within a relevant market as an indi7
rect indication of market power.
Regardless of whether a case is brought pursuant to section 2 or
section 7, the relevant market has two dimensions: the relevant product

market and the relevant geographic market. 8 The importance of properly defining the scope of either dimension cannot be overemphasized.
An antitrust violation is much more likely to be found under a narrow

market definition selectively focused on an area of the industry in
which the defendant has a relatively large market share than under a

market definition encompassing a broader area of business. 9 Since the
choice of the relevant market is so important, the standards governing

market definition must be chosen and applied with care.
Unfortunately, the application of distinct, well-defined relevant
market standards is complicated by the fact that relevant markets are
considered in at least two different contexts-section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.'0 It is clear that market power
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
5. See II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, T5 507-16.
6. See Upshaw 428-45.
7. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S 563, 571 (1966) (a Sherman Act section 2
case); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38, 343-44 (1962) (a Clayton Act
section 7 case).
8. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (Clayton Act case); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934)
(Sherman Act case).
One author has suggested that there are four market dimensions; to the accepted geographic
and product dimensions, he adds time and function:
Products available at different times are generally not economically substitutable and
therefore cannot be considered part of one and the same market. Where there is price
differentiation between two or more classes of customers for the same product-e.g.,
functional discounts-we speak of the functional dimension of the market.
J. AARTS, ANTITRUST POLICY VERSUS ECONOMIC POWER

41 (1975).

9. For example, company .4 might sell ninety percent of all the widgets sold in Pennsylvania, while selling only seven percent of all the widgets sold nationwide. Company A obviously possesses no market power if the geographic market is defined to be the nation; on the other
hand, if the relevant market is narrowed to include only Pennsylvania, Company A's power is
certainly monopolistic. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane),
351 U S. 377, 379-80 (1956). But see United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (merger case in which defendant argued in favor of a narrower market definition
in order to show that the two merging companies did not compete in the same market), rev'd, 378
U.S. 441 (1964).
10. Section 2 proscribes actual market-or "monopoly"-power. See United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (market power-or "monopoly
power"--defined as "the power to control prices or exclude competition"). Section 7, on the other
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must be determined for actions brought pursuant to either statute, but

it is also clear that the degree and level of market power necessary for
finding a violation under each differs. However, it is uncertain whether
the standards for determining the relevant geographic and product
markets are the same under each statute, and, hence, interchangeable.
Examination of the case law and commentary on this point reveals a

great deal of confusion."
Much of the confusion can be traced to dicta in the 1966 Supreme
Court decision of United States v. Grinnell Corp.,12 suggesting that the
standards for determining the relevantproductmarket for both statutes
are completely interchangeable.' 3 While some lower courts have

adopted this suggestion,14 at least one court has explicitly found it unpersuasive.' 5 That court has been joined by several other lower courts
hand, attempts to check incipient trends toward market power. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (although the Court spoke in terms of "arresting mergers at a time
when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency," it is
nevertheless clear that the Court was discussing the need to arrest the growth of undue market
power).
11. Compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966) ("We see no reason to
differentiate between [relevant product market standards for purposes] of the Clayton Act and
[those] for purposes of the Sherman Act") with Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814
(9th Cir. 1961) ("the [relevant market] issue under [§ 7 of the Clayton] Act here . . . is quite
different from that arising under § 2 of the Sherman Act"), cert. denied,370 U.S. 937 (1962) and
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("the section 7
market is [not necessarily] the same as the market for purposes of other sections of the antitrust
laws") and Schlade, ProposedRelevant Product Market Criteria Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act andSection 7ofthe Clayton Act, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 376, 378 (1966) ("While a determination
and section 7...
of the relevant product market is absolutely essential under both section 2...
it would be erroneous to conclude that the definitions of the market are, or should be, identical
regardless of statutory context. Such definitions cannot be identical because the legislative policies
of the two acts diverge") and Upshaw 485 ("prior to 1964, no court in an actual decision on the
merits (as distinguished from use of dicta) had ever held that a 'line of commerce' and 'section of
the country' for section 7 purposes might be something different from a relevant competitive market for Sherman Act purposes"). Cf. Note, The Market: A Concept in Anti-trust, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 580, 582 (1954) ("It is not clear how much stricter [the Clayton Act] test is than the test of
monopoly imposed by the Sherman Act..
12. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
13. Id. at 573 ("We see no reason to differentiate between [relevant product market standards
as defined by] 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and 'part' of commerce for
purposes of the Sherman Act").
14. See, e.g., Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488, 494 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d
1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975); H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,082,
at 74,710 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1978); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1114-15
n,20 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 500 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 369 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'don
othergrounds, 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
15. See United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976). That court
stated:
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that remain silent on the validity of the Grinnell dictum but neverthe-

less recognize distinctions between relevant product market standards
under section 2 and section 7.16
Even less settled than the question of interchangeable standards
for determining the relevant product market is the question of inter-

changeable standards for determining the relevant geographic market.
This Comment addresses the latter issue. In order to determine

whether any distinction should be drawn between the standards for defining relevant geographic market as applied under the respective statutes, this Comment will briefly outline the standards that courts have

developed under each statute and will analyze points at which they diverge and converge. In this regard, several relevant product market

cases will be considered, since many similarities exist between relevant
product market and relevant geographic market delineation criteria,
and since arguments that relevant product market standards are inter-

changeable may also apply to the contention that relevant geographic
market standards are interchangeable. Finally, after examining the

cases and the legislative history underlying section 7 of the Clayton
Act, this Comment will conclude that, because of the different purposes

of the statutes, at least some section 7 relevant market standards should
not be applied in Sherman Act cases.
There is no indication that the [Grinnel4 Court intended to state a general rule for all
situations. Rather, the Court was noting that in the particular circumstances before it, a
Clayton Act case was an appropriate precedent, even though the Court was deciding a
Sherman Act question. Although Sherman Act cases certainly are relevant and are entitled to some weight in defining a "line of commerce" under the Clayton Act, we believe
that cases decided under the Clayton Act, are stronger precedents, since the tests may
differ somewhat under each act.
Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296, 1302 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978)
(case involving both section 2 and section 7 issues in which the court stressed that a submarket
"may constitute a product market under the Clayton Act" and made no mention of the Sherman
Act) (emphasis added); United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324, 343 n.16
(E.D. La. 1968) (court refused to extend the relevant market analysis of a Sherman Act case to a
Clayton Act case); Luria Bros., 62 F.T.C. 243, 604 n.14 (1962) (opinion) ("The statute writers use
different terms to describe the relevant market" in the Sherman and Clayton Acts), affidsub nom.
Luria Bros. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968). Cf.Telex Corp. v.
IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 336 (N.D. Okla. 1973) ("in my opinion, while there may be a possible
differentiation between a 'part of commerce' and a 'line of commerce' in the solution of some
problems that might arise under the respective acts, no practical distinction would be justified in
the context of the present case"), a'd inpartandrevd
"inpartper curiam, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), quoted in Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,054, at 96,735 (D. Utah 1974), a2 7'd in part and rev'd inpart,551 F.2d 790
(10th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 879 (1977); American Brake Shoe Co., 73 F.T.C. 610, 640 (1968)
(initial decision) ("There is a basic distinction between § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the
Clayton Act") (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593-94 n.36
(S.D.N.Y. 1958)), modfied on othergrounds sub nom. ABEX Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 865 (1970).
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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR DELINEATION OF
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

In contrast to section 2, which deals with actual monopolization as
the ultimate question of fact, 17 section 7 concerns monopolization in its
incipient stages. The fundamental purpose of the 1950 amendment to
section 7 of the Clayton Act' 8 was "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects
as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding."' 9 The statutes are therefore similar because each addresses monopolization, but dissimilar because each addresses monopolistic conduct at a different stage of
development. Given the underlying similarity, it might be expected
that the courts would find certain basic concepts about defining the relevant market applicable to cases arising in either context. This indeed
is what the courts have done. 20 Nevertheless, because of the different
thresholds of illegality, the interchangeability of the standards cannot
be complete. The necessity for distinguishing between the market definitions applied in cases brought under the two statutes becomes apparent when the case law and statutory amendments are placed in their
proper legal, legislative, and historical contexts.
A.

Standards/orDeterminingRelevant GeographicMarket Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

The concept of a relevant market within which to measure the
market share and market power of the defendant in a Sherman Act
section 2 case evolved slowly. 2 1 This is not surprising. Sherman Act
standards of illegality themselves developed slowly2 2 as did the concept
of a "relevant market. 2 3 During the early decades of this century,
Sherman Act cases placed virtually no emphasis upon assessment of
17. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 380
(1956).
18. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976))
(amending Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)). The 1950 amendment is commonly
known as and hereinafter referred to as the "Celler-Kefauver Amendment."
19. S. REP. No. 1775, at 4-5, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4296. Accordingly,
section 7 condemns those mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
20. See notes 68, 70, 74, & 79-85 infra and text accompanying notes 67-85 infra.
21. Upshaw 428.
22. Upshaw 428-29. See generally W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT

(1966); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL

ANTITRUST POLICY:

ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive
Instrument afProgress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1947).
23. Upshaw 428.
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market control. 24 Then, after a lull in prosecutions during the Great
Depression, the current era in Sherman Act analysis began. 25 Increasingly concerned with market power and its anticompetitive effects,
courts and the antitrust bar began to realize that more sophisticated

techniques for assessing market power were needed. 26 It was within
this context that the present concepts of market analysis and relevant

markets emerged as major elements in the proof of Sherman Act violations.

27

In theory at least, the Sherman Act standards for delineating relevant markets are straightforward. Section 2 proscribes monopolization
of "any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations ....-28 The quoted phrase is generally construed as
referring to the relevant market. 29 The geographic dimension of the
24. Id. 430. This was true despite the Supreme Court's implicit recognition of relevant markets in 1911 in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). Indeed, upon examining
three significant Supreme Court Sherman Act cases of the 1920s, United States v. Southern Pac.
Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), one commentator observed that "no particular
nexus had [yet] been established between economic control of a particular market area and illegality under the Sherman Act. One consequence was that the Court did not find it necessary to
develop guidelines to aid in assessing the degree of economic power possessed by antitrust defendants." Upshaw 432.
25. Upshaw 432-33 (tracing the origins of the revitalization of Sherman Act standards to the
"growing conviction that a chief cause of the Great Depression had been the rigidity of industrial
prices in the face of drastically declining demand due to monopolistic control of many basic industries"). See generally Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the
New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353, 1354-57 (describing the three "generations" of antitrust ideology, concluding that after United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), "the concept of market power rather than abusive conduct served as the main theme in
determining illegality").
26. Upshaw 439.
27. Id. 439-45.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
29. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). See generally Indiana
Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1934).
Two commentators assert that, in a more technical sense, the relevant geographic market
requirement "flows from the very concept of monopoly ... ; it does not rest upon the language of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act." G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT § 3.7, at 116 (1958) (footnote omitted). The reasoning supporting this assertion is that
the concept of "the market" is not brought into the antitrust laws by the words "any
part" in Section 2; rather it is integral to the basic concept of "monopolization," and the
ideas of competition and monopoly on which it rests. Thus, Section 2 of the Sherman
Act deals with monopolization affecting markets which constitute "any part" of the trade
or commerce covered by the Act. To be sure, an appreciable amount of commerce is a
"part" of commerce, but control over an appreciable amount of commerce does not necessarily mean control over an identifiable market which constitutes an appreciable
"part" of commerce.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 47 (emphasis in original). See also Note, supra note 11, at
580.
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relevant market is often defined as the geographic area over which the
products in question are traded30 and effectively compete.3 t A more
complete definition takes into consideration the realities of the marketplace. 3 2 According to Professor Sullivan:
To define a market in product and geographic terms is to say that if
prices were appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed for
the product within a given area, while demand held constant, supply
from other sources could not be expected to enter promptly enough
and in large enough amounts to restore the old price or volume. If
sufficient supply would promptly enter from other geographic areas,
then the "defined market" is not wide enough in geographic terms
... A "relevant market," then, is the narrowest market which is
wide enough so that products from adjacent areas or from other procompete on substantial parity with
ducers in the same area cannot
33
those included in the market.
Section 2 cases often speak in terms of "economic significance"
and "area of effective competition" when defining a relevant geographic market.3 4 Thus, the courts agree that the section 2 relevant
30. Cf.Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., 1971 Trade Cas. 173,761, at 91,214 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(defining the relevant geographic market as coextensive with UPS's service area).
31.

J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REG-

ULATION) § 8.02[2], at 8-13 to -15 (1979); see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76
(1966); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1978) (a
section 7 case); TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 462 F.2d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1972). See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 299-300 n.5 (1949); Mullis v. Arco
Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 295 & n. 15 (7th Cir. 1974); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at
44-45.
32. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966).
33. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 12, at 41 (1977). See generally II
517-36.
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
34. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding the
relevant geographic market to be" 'the area of effective competition,' the area 'in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies' "), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978); Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 918 (8th Cir.
1976) (speaking in terms of the "area in which the defendant effectively competes with other
individuals or businesses for the distribution of the relevant product"); Structure Probe, Inc. v.
The Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (recognizing that "a geographic market must correspond to the 'commercial realities' of the market for [the relevant product] and must
be an economically significant market area"), aft'd, 595 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. T 62,053, at 74,539 (W.D. Ky.) (stating that "the relevant geographic market is the market in which competitors effectively compete, and in which the seller
supplies and to which the purchaser can practically turn for supplies"), modfled, 1978-2 Trade
Cas. T 62,186 (W.D. Ky.), modfifed, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,493 (W.D. Ky. 1978); Allen Ready
Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 1 73,955, at 92,004 (W.D. Tenn.
1972) (speaking in terms of area of "effective competition"); Cal Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distribs., Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (looking to economically significant factors).
On the other hand, some section 2 cases have adopted the more lax criteria announced by the
Supreme Court in the section 7 case of United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
In that case, the Court held that the relevant geographic language of section 7 "requires merely
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market need not be nationwide, 3 5 and that the area of effective compe-

tition may be so small as to justify a relevant geographic market no
larger than a section of a

city. 3 6

Furthermore, it has been suggested

that certain barriers to entry into a particular geographic area require
that such an area be designated the relevant geographic market, even
37
though the product is actually distributed more widely.
B.

Standardsfor Determining Relevant Geographic Market Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

In cases brought pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 courts
apply relevant market criteria somewhat similar to those set forth in

section 2 case law. 39 The standards are not identical, however. The
nature of the Clayton Act itself provides the basis for distinguishing its
relevant market standards from those that have developed in the secthat the Government prove the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in
the United States .... ." Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
35. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 299-300 n.5 (1949).
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the Supreme Court stated that
the Sherman Act is not limited to eliminating restraints whose effects cover the entire
United States; we have consistently held that where the relevant competitive market covers only a small area the Sherman Act may be invoked to prevent unreasonable restraints within that area.
Id. at 519.
36. See William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945) (downtown theatre district held to be relevant geographic market), cert. denied,334 U.S. 811 (1948). See
also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (relevant geographic
market defined as New Orleans); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (city of
Lorain, Ohio held to be relevant geographic market).
37. See generally Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem ofGeographicMarket Delineationin Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes those mergers "where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect. . . may be substantially to lessen
competition, or. . . tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). The
phrase "any line of commerce" refers to the relevant product market. Similarly, "any section of
the country" denotes the geographic dimension of the relevant market. Brown Shoe v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1966).
39. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 552 n.7 (Ist
Cir. 1974) ("cases. . . decided under. . . the Clayton Act ... offer guidanceto market definition
under Sherman Act claims") (emphasis added), cert.denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v.
Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Although Sherman Act cases certainly are relevant and are entitled to some weight in defining a 'line of commerce' under the
Clayton Act, we believe that cases decided under the Clayton Act, are stronger precedents, since
the tests may differ somewhat under each Act").
On the other hand, some cases have held that the analogy is absolute and the standards are
completely interchangeable. See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449,
454 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (as to section 2 issues), rev'd on othergrounds, 389
U.S. 384 (1967); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(applying section 7 submarket analysis to a section 2 case), aft'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
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tion 2 case law. The purpose of section 7 of the Clayton Act--couched
in terms of "may," "tend," and "any"-is to check restraints of trade in
their formative stages, well before they have attained such large-scale
effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.40 This purpose is
manifested throughout the entire statute, and the section 7 treatment of
relevant markets is particularly important to its accomplishment. Section 7 codifies the relevant market concept in a manner that gives the
courts great freedom in selecting a relevant market. In terms more explicit than those found in section 2, 4 t the relevant product market is
described as "any line of commerce," 42 and the relevant geographic
' 43
market requirement is described as "any section of the country.

Given this broad, sweeping language, it is not surprising that
44
courts adjudicating cases brought pursuant to the amended section 7
slowly developed approaches to relevant market definition that were
more flexible than those that had theretofore been used in section 2
cases. This trend finally culminated in the landmark Supreme Court
decision of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,45 in which the innovative
concept of relevant "submarkets" was adopted.4 6 For the most part,
Brown Shoe is a relevant product market case, although the Court also
made some important observations regarding relevant geographic markets.
After considering the section 2 approach of establishing a single
relevant product market on the basis of the "reasonable interchangeability" test,47 the Court found the utility of that approach in a section 7
40. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962).
41. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441, 469 n.4 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963);

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). See United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620 n.18 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7,38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amendedby Act of
Dec, 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125).

45. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
46. Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
47. In the landmark decision of United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377 (1956), the Supreme Court laid down economic guidelines for delineating

relevant product markets in section 2 cases along the lines of reasonable interchangeability of
products:
When a product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the market,
there is monopoly power. Because most products have possible substitutes, we cannot
. . . give "that infinite range" to the definition of substitutes. Nor is it a proper interpretation of the Sherman Act to require that products be fungible to be considered in the

relevant market.
But where there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their pur-
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context to be limited solely to establishing the "outer boundaries of a
product market [within which] well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes." 4 8 The Court did not depart from the section 2 approach without good reason; the submarket concept resulted directly from the very
language of section 7 itself:
Because § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition "in any line of commerce," . . . it is
necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each economically sign//cant submarket to determine if there is a reasonable
probability
49
that the merger will substantially lessen competition.
The Court did not restrict itself to relevant product market delineation, but went even further in dictum, extending the submarket
concept to relevant geographic market delineations as well:
The criteria to be used in determining the appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to those used to determine the
relevant product market. . . . Moreover, just as a product submarket may have § 7 significance as the proper "line of commerce,"
so may a geographic submarket be considered the appropriate "section of the country." . . . [Section 7] speaks of "any . . .section of
the country," and if anticompetitive effects of a merger are probable
in "any" significant market, the merger-at least to that extent-is
proscribed.50
Significantly, the Brown Shoe Court did not read the word "any"
literally. As with product markets and submarkets, the Court cautioned that geographic markets and submarkets should not be chosen
arbitrarily, but rather should be economically significant and correspond to the commercial realities of the industry.5 ' The Court had little more to say about the determination of relevant geographic markets
52
in Brown Shoe, however, since that issue was not in dispute.
Since Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to establish section 7 relevant geographic market standards. The
pioses, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to be monopoized differs from others. If it were not so, only physically identical products would be a
part of the market. . . . What is called for is an appraisal of the "cross-elasticity" of
demand in the trade. . . .The varying circumstances of each case determine the result.
In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that [relevant market],

monopolization of which may be illegal.
Id. at 394-95 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
48. 370 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added). See J. AARTS, supra note 8,at 336-37.
49. 370 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added to "economically significant").
50. Id. at 336-37 (footnote omitted).
51. LId.
52. Id. at 337.
t
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opinions, however, are not totally consistent.5 3 United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co. 5 4 is probably the most controversial post-Brown Shoe
opinion dealing with relevant geographic market definition criteria for
merger cases. 55 The district court had dismissed that case, finding that
the government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence in support of
its delineation of a relevant geographic market.5 6 The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that section 7 requirements had been met since the
evidence showed a trend toward concentration 57 in the three areas alleged by the government to be the relevant geographic markets.5 8 The
Court asserted that the relevant geographic market for an alleged section 7 violation need not be delineated by metes and bounds, 59 and
concluded that "[t]he language of [section 7] requires merely that the
Government prove the merger may have a substantial effect somewhere
in the United States-'in any section' of the United States. 6 o
The Pabst Court used the Brown Shoe relevant geographic submarket concept, 6' yet cited the earlier decision only once, and then only
53. In fact, all of the Court's attempts to apply Brown Shoe geographic and product market
standards have been characterized by Professor Posner as "aberrant." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 130 (1976).
54. 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (a section 7 case challenging Pabst's acquisition of Blatz Brewing

Company).
55. Notably, Pabst was issued concurrently with Grinnel, which itself sparked controversy
regarding the proper section 2 relevant geographic market standards. See text accompanying
notes 12-16 supra and 69-71 infra.
56. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 487-88, 495 (E.D. Wis. 1964), rev'd,
384 U.S. 546 (1966).
57. 384 U.S. at 550-52. Cf. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (a section 7 case that, like Pabst, involved evidence of a steady trend toward economic concentration
deduced from the decline in the number of competitors and not on the basis of market share

alone).
58. The relevant geographic markets and submarkets proposed by the government were the

entire United States, a three-state area, and Wisconsin. 384 U.S. at 548. See United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. at 477.
59. 384 U.S. at 549. Seeid. (It is not necessary "to show a 'relevant geographic market' in the
same way the corpus delecti must be proved in a crime [or] to prove by an army of expert witnesses what constitutes a relevant 'economic' or 'geographic' market

. .

.") But cf. SmithKline

Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1974), for
the proposition that "ain inquiry as to the metes and bounds of the relevant product market is
necessitatedby.

.

. section two of the Sherman Act") (emphasis added), aj#'d, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
60. 384 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added to "somewhere"). The Court elaborated, stating that
all that need be proven in order to sustain a section 7 violation is [1] that there has been a
merger between two corporations engaged in commerce and [2] that the effect of the
merger may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce "in any section of the country."

Id. (emphasis in original).
61. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 336-37. See text accompanying notes 50-51
supra. Even though the Pabst Court never mentioned the term "submarket," it clearly had the
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for purposes of general reference.62 Because the Pabst Court seemed to
ignore the "economic significance" and "commercial realities" requirements, 63 the case has been read as abolishing the necessity of delineating a relevant market at all.64 Primarily for this reason, the decision

has been the subject of severe criticism, 65 although it is still the law. 66
C.

The Amalgamation of Section 7 and Section 2 Relevant Geographic

Market Standards.
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown
Shoe in 1962, there was no indication that the relevant market and
submarket standards announced there were applicable to any cases except those arising under section 7. Nevertheless, courts slowly began
citing the standards developed under one statute in cases that arose
under the other statute, and vice versa. Eventually, most courts neglected to recognize any distinctions at all between the statutes' respective relevant geographic market standards. The failure to make the
distinction was due, in part, to the fact that standards developed under
one statute are applicable by analogy to the other. 67 Many courts, however, have gone beyond analogical applications and have applied the
68
case law as if the standards were completely interchangeable.
The Supreme Court dictum in Grinnell to the effect that relevant
product market standards were interchangeable fathered most of this
confusion.69 While that dictum was specifically directed at relevant
product market analysis, courts have subsequently interpreted it as
Brown Shoe concept in mind. Three relevant geographic markets were found: Wisconsin was a
submarket of a larger three-state area that, in turn, was a submarket of the entire United States,
384 U.S. at 548, 551-52.
62. 384 U.S. at 551 n.4 (stating that Brown Shoe and other cases generally supported the
Court's finding of a section 7 violation in each of the three proposed relevant geographic markets).
63. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
64. See Hale & Hale, Delineating the GeographicMarket: A Problem in Merger Cases, 61
Nw. U.L. REV. 538, 540 (1966); Comment, 'Relevant Market" Under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts asAffected by Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1094, 1105.
65. Professor Posner, for instance, has characterized the opinion as being born in "a fit of
nonsense." R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 130.
66. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 n.20 (1974) (implicitly admitting the validity of Pabst, although attempting to distinguish it in dictum).
67. See note 15 supra.
68. For the most part, the influence has been unidirectional, with the more pervasive standards of section 7 cases being applied in the section 2 context. But cf.note 15 supra (describing a
section 7 case where the government unsuccessfully attempted to apply section 2 standards). This
trend is consistent with the prosecutorial aims of the government. Only the government is in a
position to effectuate a coherent, unified antitrust policy. Since the government's avowed goal is
promoting competition, it understandably prefers wider use of flexible section 7 standards-which
broaden the scope of the antitrust laws-to the more limited section 2 standards. See note 9 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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equally applicable to geographic market analysis. 70 This interpretation
is especially troublesome in light of the contemporaneous liberalization
71
of section 7 relevant geographic market standards under Pabst.
An early example of the mixing of section 7 and section 2 relevant
72
market criteria occurred in Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
a Ninth Circuit case decided in 1966. The action sought treble damages for alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Before analyzing the product and geographic dimensions of the relevant market, the court remarked that "it is clear that the same determination must be made regarding the relevant market in actions for
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act" as is made in actions for
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.73 Consequently, in its determination of the relevant geographic market, the court relied heavily on
the section 7 criteria articulated in Brown Shoe and Pabst,74 concluding
that both an outer geographic market and several inner submarkets are
appropriate for a section 2 action: "[I]t is clear from the recent case of
United States v. Pabst Brewing Company . . .that . . . the relevant
market may at the same time be national, regional, and statewide in
area."' 75 In spite of this observation, and although there is some language in the opinion indicating that other markets might have been
considered, 76 the court defined a single, narrow market. 77 This is as it
should be, since multiple market definitions involving the submarket
approach have no place in section 2 analysis.78 Moreover, the court's
70. E.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1305
(5th Cir. 197 1) (reading words into the Grinnell dictum that actually are not there by stating that
"section 7's use of'any section of the country' [was] equated [by the Grinnell Court] to section 2's
'any part of the trade or commerce among the several states' "), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
Accord, Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir.
1975) ("The area of effective competition is defined in terms of a product market and a geographic
market. . . .The same inquiries regarding the relevant market must ... be undertaken in actions
charging violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act" as in actions charging violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing the
Grinnell dictum as a rule for relevant market definition in general, instead of citing it under the
relevant product market heading), cert. denied,387 U.S. 932 (as to section 2 issues), rev'don other
grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
71. See text accompanying notes 53-66 supra.
72. 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (as to section 2 issues), rev'don
othergrounds,389 U.S. 384 (1967).
73. 369 F.2d at 454.
74. The court explicitly justified its use of relevant product market standards enunciated in
section 7 cases by citing the Grinnelldictum. See id. In its use of section 7 *cases to determine the
relevant geographic market, however, the court neither offered, nor could offer, similar justification. See id. at 455-58.
75. Id. at 457 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
76. The court did allude to market shares in a national market. Id. at 452.
77. Id. at 454-58.
78. See text accompanying notes 174-75 infra.
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narrow market definition seems to be fortuitously correct, even in light
of section 2 standards. 79 The accuracy of the market definition in CaseSwayne, however, does not lessen the harm to section 2 analysis in-

flicted by the notion that there may be geographic submarkets within
the "outer boundary"8' 0 of the relevant geographic market as determined by the traditional section 2 criteria. 8'
Following the Ninth Circuit's lead in Case-Swayne, other courts
began assuming that standards for determining relevant geographic
market developed under section 2 and section 7 were freely interchangeable.8 2 Some section 2 cases have gone so far as to cite Pabst for
the proposition that the relevant geographic market need not be defined with any specificity whatsoever,8 3 while others seem to adhere to
79. The relevant product market was defined as oranges, which, for all practical purposes,
could only be transported to buyers within a relatively small geographic area. Thus, Case-Swayne
is an excellent example of market definition along the lines of transportation barriers. See generally II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 523 (discussing transportation barriers as factors
in relevant geographic market delineation).
80. Cf.Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 325 (submarket analysis within "outer
boundaries" necessary under section 7 to determine if merger will lessen competition).
81. It has been argued, however, that the Case-Swayne relevant geographic submarket approach does not signify a new test for determining the relevant geographic market for purposes of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, but rather that it merely emphasizes the well-established rule that
while under certain circumstances the relevant market may encompass the entire country, it may
in other circumstances be limited to a much more narrow area-a relevant geographic "submarket." J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 31, § 8.02[2]. The problem is that the meaning of the
word "submarket," which first arose in Brown Shoe as a term of art, has degenerated to a point
where, in many cases, it might be used to indicate only a market that is less than broad. In such a
situation, the term "submarket" does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the relevant market
standards of section 7 cases, just as citation to section 7 cases in actions brought under section 2
does not necessarily imply a complete approval of the section 7 rationale. For this reason, legal
arguments using the word "submarket" should be carefully scrutinized.
82. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1974) (section 2
case dispensing with the need for a definite market definition by citing Pabst), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1110 (1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (section 2 case relying on Pabst and Brown Shoe); Credit Bureau
Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 789 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (section 2 case relying on
Case-Swayne for proposition that it "is settled that the same criteria used in determining relevant
market under one provision must be used in determining relevant market under the other"), a'd,
476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973).
83. An example is Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974). There,
the district court had granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the antitrust claims for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit found that a section 2 claim was adequately stated in spite of mere conclusory allegations
establishing a relevant geographic market. 493 F.2d at 45-46. In support of its holding, the court
found Pabst controlling:
Although there might be some limited excursions outside the territorial boundaries of the
state in performing the obligations under the insurance contracts, the perimeters of the
"exact spot" of a relevant market need not be outlined. It is enough to show a relevant
area in which the defendants might exclude competition.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
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section 2 criteria but with a cavalier attitude.84 Most cases, however,

are similar to Case-Swayne and do not go to such extremes; they
merely recite the relevant geographic market criteria from the other
line of case law, and either use those criteria for purposes of analogy or
apply them so as to reach a result consistent with the traditional relevant market standards developed under the particular statute in85
volved.
One recent case, however, has explicitly held that the standards set
out in Pabst and Brown Shoe are inapplicable to a Sherman Act proceeding. That case, UnitedStates Y. Dairymen, Inc.,86 involved an action against an agricultural cooperative marketing association of dairy
farmers, alleging attempted monopolization of the sale of milk in the
southeastern United States. 87 Crucial to the court's decision, and in

much dispute, was the determination of the relevant geographic market. 88 The record showed that the member-producers and the market-

ing facilities of Dairymen were located throughout the Southeast. 89 In
approximately one-half of the states in that area the sale of milk was
regulated by the states, and in the remainder milk sales were regulated
84. See, e.g., Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 376 F. Supp. 546, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(commenting that a local area "will serve" as a relevant geographic market when "by [the) nature
of the business involved, it is uneconomical to operate on a national scale (though the defendants
may operate in many locations throughout the nation)"), vacated, 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
85. In addition to Case-Swayne, an interesting example is Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (a section 2 case). After
the traditional reiteration of the Grinnelldictum regarding the interchangeability of section 7 and
section 2 relevant product market standards that had become commonplace in post-Grinnelldecisions, the district court determined that the relevant product market was major league professional
hockey. Id. at 500-02. The relevant geographic market delineation followed similar lines. Id. at
502. The record established that the teams comprising the National Hockey League, which are
located solely in the United States and Canada, historically turned to amateur league teams in
those two countries as a source of supply of new talent. The defendants asserted, however, that
Europe was also a potentially large source of supply of professional players. Id.
In spite of the fact that this case arose under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court relied
exclusively on the principles set forth in the section 7 market definition cases of Brown Shoe and
Pabst. Consequently, the district court found the relevant geographic market to be the United
States and Canada, sidestepping the issue of whether the market should include Europe by citing
the section 7 cases and stating that the "language of the Sherman Act itself does not require a
monopolization of all the trade or commerce, but rather anypart of the trade or commerce among
the several states or with foreign nations." Id. (emphasis in original).
In this situation, however, no egregious error was committed. The mere allegation that Europe was a potentialsourceof supply, alone, is not enough to establish a larger relevant geographic
market. Thus, without more facts, the court seems to have correctly defined the market, albeit by
the improper means of submarket analysis.
86. 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,053, at 74,535 (W.D. Ky.), modifled, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,186
(Q.D.Ky.), modfled, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,493 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
87. 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,536.
88. Id. at 74,538.
89. Id. at 74,537.
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by Federal Milk Marketing Orders. 90 Consequently, the government
admitted that the relevant geographic market was the Southeast, but
contended that that area only represented the "outer boundary" of two
smaller geographic submarkets delineated on the basis of state or federal milk sales regulation. 9'
The district court recognized the long-established definition of the
relevant geographic market as "the market in which competitors effectively compete, and in which the seller supplies and to which the purchaser can practically turn for supplies. '92 Applying this rule, the
district court found the relevant market to be the southeastern area of
the United States with the exception of Florida. The Dairymen court
rejected the government's claim that the defendant dominated a relevant geographic submarket comprised of the areas affected by the Federal Milk Marketing Orders, and found that the Clayton Act cases that
the government relied upon in support of its submarket claim 93 were of
no assistance in delineating a relevant geographic market in a section 2
case. 94 The court emphasized that those cases were brought pursuant
to section 7 of the Clayton Act,95 "which refers specifically to lessening
of competition in anypart of the country. Under that very broad statute, the concept of relevant geographic submarkets has been developed." 96 On the basis of terminology and purpose alone, the court
found section 7 to differ significantly from section 2:
It would seem that [section 7] was enacted to prevent the anticompetitive effect of mergers which would in any way diminish competition
substantially in anypart of the country, whereas the sections of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, upon which [the government]
relies, are
97
not couched in such local and pragmatic terms.
The court also provided a second rationale for rejecting the government's submarket theory. It reasoned that the unwieldy nature of a
section 2 case would be intensified if further analysis of submarkets
were required:
90. Id.

91. Id. at 74,538-39.
92. Id. at 74,539.
93. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
94. 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,539-40.
95. However, the StandardOil case was actually brought pursuant to section 3 of the Clayton
Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court based its decision on its interpretation of section
3 of the Clayton Act and did not reach, therefore, the Sherman Act question. 337 U.S. at 314.
96. 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,540 (emphasis added). The court stated that it could find no
cases in which the section 7 submarket approach had been applied to section 2 cases. However,
there do seem to be several such cases. See notes 72-85 supra and accompanying text. But see
note 81 supra.

97. 1978-1 Trade Cas. at 74,540 (emphasis added).
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[L]ogic would require that the Court examine in detail the market
statistics in each and every geographic subdivision in which defendant competes, and might even require the establishment of many relevant geographic submarkets which could be as small as the city
limits of a municipality or the boundaries of a county. While such a
result would be acceptable in a suit brought under.

.

.[section 7 of

the Clayton Act], we do not believe that it would follow that it is
acceptable here. 98

Having defined the market to be the entire southeastern United States,
except Florida, and having found Dairymen's share in that market to
be small, the court held that Dairymen had not violated the provisions
of the Sherman Act.99
The Dairymen decision currently stands alone among relevant geographic market cases in holding that geographic submarket analysis is
inapplicable to section 2 cases.'t° In fact, no other court has squarely
addressed the issue.'t0 Perhaps the question of interchangeability was
never brought to the attention of other courts. 0 2 Nonetheless, this is
not a sufficient reason for disregarding the district court's holding in
Dairymen. Since the Dairymen court's reasoning in support of its holding is not extensive, however, more analysis of the pertinent case law
and legislative histories is necessary.
II.

THE INTERCHANGEABILITY OF METHODS FOR DETERMINING
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET

The Supreme Court indicated in dictum in United States v. Grinnell Corp.'0 3 that relevant product market standards under section 2
and section 7 are similar, if not completely interchangeable: there is
"no reason to differentiate between 'line' of commerce in the context of
the Clayton Act and 'part' of commerce for purposes of the Sherman
Act."' t0 4 In Brown Shoe Co. v. UnitedStates,0 5 the Court noted, again
in dictum, that criteria for determining relevant product markets and
relevant geographic markets are generally similar; the Court concluded
that because the relevant product market may be divided into sub98. Id.
99. Id. at 74,547.
100. Some cases dealing with the relevantproduct market have so held. See cases cited in
notes 15-16 supra.
101. See notes 72-85 supra and accompanying text.
102. To be sure, even the defendants in Dairymen did not suggest the theory ultimately
adopted by the court in that case. See Post-Trial Brief for Defendant, United States v. Dairymen,
Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,053 (W.D. Ky.) modified, 1978-2 Trade Cas. %62,186 (W.D. Ky.),
modfied, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,493 (W.D.Ky. 1978).
103. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
104. Id. at 573.
105. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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markets for purposes of section 7, the relevant geographic market may
also be so divided.10 6 Taken together, the dicta of the Court in Brown
Shoe and Grinnell could be construed as follows: since there are relevant product submarkets under section 7, there are relevant product
submarkets under section 2; and since similarities exist between relevant product and geographic market criteria, there must also be relevant geographic submarkets under section 2. Analysis along these lines
would indicate that all relevant market standards are interchangeable.
This conclusion is simply not warranted.
As previously discussed, breaking relevant markets into smaller
submarkets can be traced at least as far back as Brown Shoe.'0 7 In
Brown Shoe the Court obviously departed from the traditional section
2 threshold question' 08 of what single relevant market should be defined for evaluating the ultimate question of monopoly'0 9 in favor of a
buckshot approach" t0 allowing the potential or actual anticompetitive
effects of a merger to be evaluated concurrently on several different
levels. The opinion stands for the proposition that a broad relevant
market's constituent submarkets are just as appropriate to the section 7
analysis as the broad market itself."' Thus, a merger can be condemned if substantial lessening of competition occurs only in a sub2
market and not in the broader market itself."
The Brown Shoe Court's analysis of relevant markets was detailed.
Although it discussed many contingencies and variations with no direct
application to the facts of the case, the Court did not consider the extent to which its holding should affect section 2 relevant market delineation.
A.

The CongressionalIntent to Maintain Certain DistinctionsBetween
the Approaches to Relevant GeographicMarket
Delineation Under Section 2 and Section 7.

The relationship between the approaches to defining relevant geographic market under section 2 and section 7 can be clarified through
106. Id. at 336-37.
107. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
108. See Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 276 (5th Cir. 1978)
("defining the relevant product and geographic markets is a threshold requirement under § 2"),
cert. denied,440 U.S. 939 (1979).
109. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
110. Indeed, "buckshot tactics" are advocated by the statutory language of section 7 that applies the statute to "any line of commerce in any section of the country." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)
(emphasis added). To be sure, section 7 markets are generally more numerous and narrower than
those that would be chosen for section 2 purposes. See J. AARTS, supra note 8, at 237-49.
111. 370 U.S. at 325.
112. J. AARTS, supra note 8, at 245.
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an examination of the legislative history underlying both the original
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914113 and the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment," 14 which amended section 7 in 1950. Careful scrutiny of
the congressional intent not only reveals strong support for the submarket approach outlined in Brown Shoe and Pabst, but also suggests
that the Clayton Act relevant geographic market standards were intended to be more probing and flexible than those that had developed
in the section 2 case law.
1. The Clayton Act of 1914. The Clayton Act was passed in order
to "supplement the purpose and effect of other antitrust legislation,
principally the Sherman Act of 1890."' '5 The antimerger provisions of
the original version of the bill as passed by the House proscribed those
stock acquisitions whose effect was "to eliminate or substantially lessen
competition.

.

.

,

or to create a monopoly of any line of trade in any

section or community.""t 6 There is no clue in the legislative history as
to the origin of the phrase "any line of trade in any section or community." It is highly probable that the phrase originated in StandardOil
Co. v. United States," 7 a major Supreme Court decision interpreting
the antimonopoly provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act. In that
case, the Court noted that the clause in section 2 of the Sherman Act
referring to monopolization of "any part of the trade or commerce"
had "both a geographical and a distributive significance."" 8 This was
the first time the Court had ever spoken in such terms. Indeed, Standard Oil is commonly recognized as expressing the original formulation of the current relevant market concept. 19 The similarities between
the language of StandardOil and the Clayton bill are significant: "any
line of trade" clearly speaks to the "distributive" aspect of a market,
while "in any section or community" is addressed to the "geographical" aspect. Given the prominence of the Standard Oil case,' 20 it is
very probable that the phrase "any line of trade in any section or com113. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
114. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
115. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922). Accord, S.
REp. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914); 51 CONG. REC. 9068 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
116. H.R. 15,657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1914), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 584, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-9 (1914).
117. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
118. Id. at 61.
119. See Upshaw 438-39.
120. Standard Oil was one of the first cases to establish the "rule of reason" standard for
Sherman Act cases. Furthermore, it was constantly referred to during the floor debates on the
Clayton Act. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 13,901 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Cummins); 51 CONG. REC.
9553 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Barkley).
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munity" was based upon the concepts expressed by the Court in that
decision. 121
Not only does it appear that Congress adopted a geographic mar-

ket concept like that formulated by the Standard Oil Court, but it is
also evident that Congress intended to adopt a statute whose applica-

tion would be more geographically probing than that of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.'2 2 At the time of the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914,

the Sherman Act was only twenty-four years old, but many cases had
already been litigated under it. No Sherman Act case brought before
the Supreme Court prior to 1914, however, was concerned with a geo-

graphic market narrower than the entire United States. 123 Thus, Congress' Clayton Act reference to "any section or community" takes on

special significance. Why would the draftsmen of the bill have used
such terms if they had not wanted to indicate a geographical focus that
could be narrower than that of the Sherman Act?

Examination of the floor debate provides some insight. After passing the House, the Clayton bill was sent to the Senate Committee on

24
the Judiciary where the language in question was entirely deleted.1

Senator Culberson, the Chairman of the Committee, outlined the ra-

tionale for the deletion during the floor debate: "[Some Committee
members feared] that the [phrase].

.

. was intended to apply to a local

transaction and would be a regulation of intrastate commerce rather

than interstate commerce, and therefore void."' 2 5 However, several
Senators felt that this construction was not justified and urged that the

phrase be left in. For instance, Senator Reed reasoned that
the House bill [was] distinctly aimed at the creation of a localized
monopoly or a localizedrestraint,as distinguished from a generalrestraint or a general monopoly. [I am] . . . very much in favor of
121. Cf. 51 CONG. REC. 14,460 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Shields) ("The policy of putting [section 7] in the bill was in keeping with that outlined by [the two political parties and the President],

after the decisions in the cases of the Standard Oil Co. and the American Tobacco Co.").
122. Note, however, that the concept of relevant geographic market as a judicial tool for monopolization cases was in its incipiency. See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is significant that courts of that time did have a conception of area of effective competition.
Indeed, many cases spoke in terms of controlling a certain percentage of the trade in the United
States. See cases cited at note 123 infra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913); United States v.
Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight &
Sons, 212 U.S. 227 (1909); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Cf.51 CONG. REC.
16,059 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Clapp) (expressing the opinion that, unless restricted by statute,
monopolies of a local market were immune to prosecution; concluding that the only monopolies
that could be prosecuted were those of national or world-wide markets).
124. S. REP. No. 698, supra note 115, at 46.
125. 51 CONG. REc. 14,419 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Culberson).
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retaining the phrase "in any section or community," because I believe we will be able in some instances to reach a condition which
probably cannot be reached under the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
I do not agree that the bill is susceptible of the construction sugas we are legislating only with reference
gested by the chairman,.
to interstate commerce this language would be construed to apply to
the creation of a local restraint by someone engaged in interstate
commerce .... 126
Senator Reed and the Senators referred to by Senator Culberson

differed only on the question of whether intrastate commerce would be
unconstitutionally affected if the phrase "any section or community"
were left in the bill. No one disputed Senator Reed's observation that
the phrase would make the antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act
much more proscriptive than section 2 of the Sherman Act by rendering the geographic scope of the former more flexible and probing than
that of the latter. Nonetheless, the bill passed the Senate with the Judi27
ciary Committee's deletion intact.'
Apparently, the fears of unconstitutionality expressed by Senator
Culberson were not shared by the conference committee. Called to resolve the discrepancies in the bill as reported by each house, 28 that
committee recognized the value of making section 7 more proscriptive

129
than section 2 and reinstated the relevant geographic market phrase.
Congress later reaffirmed its desire to create different standards for sec126. Id. (remarks of Sen. Reed) (emphasis added).
Many Senators feared that the deletion of the phrase "any section or community" from the
bill would simply mark a retreat to the Sherman Act standards. See, e.g., id. 14,316 (remarks of
Sen. Cummins).
127. Id. 14,319.
128. See S. Doc. No. 584, supra note 116, at 8-9 (1914) (a section-by-section comparison of
the Senate, House, and conference committee versions of the Clayton Act). Portions of this document are reprinted in 51 CONG. REC. 15,790 (1914).
129. The conference committee met and reported the bill with the phrase "any section or
community" no longer modifying both the restraint of commerce and monopoly clauses, see quotation in text accompanying note 126 supra, but instead modifying the restraint of commerce
clause alone. S. Doc. No. 584, supra note 116, at 8. The alteration was inconsequential, and was
only made because the phrase was perceived to be superfluous in modifying the monopoly clause.
51 CONG. REC. 16,047-48 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Chilton). Reasoning that a monopoly was selfdefining and could not operate on several geographical levels at the same time for purposes of a
section 2 prosecution, Senator Chilton, a member of the six-man conference committee, stated that
"a monopoly is a monopoly anywhere and everywhere. . . . It is a monopoly or it is not a monopoly." Id. The Senator further reasoned that
If it is a monopoly in interstate commerce, that is what we have power to deal with, and
to put in the words "in any section or community" would simply becloud the definition
and make it, possibly, inconsistent with itself and with everything else. A monopoly in
interstate commerce is a monopoly in interstate commerce; you can not qualify it; you
can not limit it; you can not extend it. If it is not a monopoly, it is not one; and it was the
deliberate judgment of the Judiciary Committee. . . itself that the words "in any section
or community" were either meaningless [modifying the monopoly clause] or else a restriction that might destroy the law, and therefore should be stricken out. . ..
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tion 7 and section 2 when it amended section 7 in 1950.130
2. The 1950 Celler-KefauverAmendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 is even more sparse than that of the original Act.

Prior to 1950, section 7 proved so unwieldy as an antimerger provision

3

that anticompetitive mergers were prosecuted under section 1 of

the Sherman Act.' 32 Section 1 antimerger actions were often impractical, 133 and the 1950 amendment was passed in reaction to what was
perceived as a "rising tide of economic concentration in the American

economy"' 134 beyond the practical reach of the Sherman Act.

35

Id. 16,048.
Thus, the alteration represents Congress' perception that monopolies cannot be viewed piece
by piece; rather they must be viewed as a whQle. It is significant that the conference committee
retained the phrase "any section or community" as applied to the restraint of commerce clause.
Therefore, Senator Reed's original recital of the congressional intent behind the relevant market
phrase, quoted in text accompanying note 126 supra, is in no way altered. Truly, then, the geographic scope of an action brought under the original Clayton Act was intended to be narrower
and more probing than that of an action under the Sherman Act.
130. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976))
(amending Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
131. S.REP. No. 1775, at 3-4, reprintedin [19501 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4295-96; Investigalion of ConcentrationofEconomic Power-FederalTrade Commission Report on MonopolisticPractices in Industries:. HearingsBefore the Temporary NationalEconomic Comm., pt. 5-A, 76th Cong.,
IstSess. 2361 (1934). Seeid. 2361-72 (summarizing cases brought pursuant to the original section

7).
132. Section 1 provides, in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Thus, section I requires two or
more firms acting in concert to restrain trade. Not all restraints of trade are proscribed--only
those that are unreasonable are illegal. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60
(1911). Certain restraints of trade are categorized as being unreasonable per se. See United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note
33, §§ 63-67.
133. Interestingly enough, one of the opponents to the 1950 amendment lent support to this
observation. Asserting that any amendment to the Clayton Act was unnecessary, Senator Donnell
outlined the applicability of section 1 as an antimerger statute in his minority views accompanying
the Senate Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendment. While demonstrating that some mergers
are vulnerable to a section 1 action, the Senator only succeeded in highlighting the difficulties that
would be encountered in attacking anticompetitive mergers under the "rule of reason" approach
of section I. See S. REP. No. 1775, at 14-16 (minority views of Sen. Donnell).
134. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); accord, S. REP. No. 1775, at
3, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4295.
135. See 96 CONG. REC. 16,501-03 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver); S. REP. No. 1775, at 34, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4295-96. But see S. REP. No. 1775, at 11-23 (minority views of Sen. Donnell).
Particularly instrumental in providing incentive for passage of the 1950 amendment was the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), which
indicated that the old version of section 7 was "inadequate to prevent mergers that had substantially lessened competition in a section of the country, but which, nevertheless, had not risen to the
level of those restraints of trade or monopoly prohibited by the Sherman Act." Brown Shoe Co. v.
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Among other changes, the statute was amended to proscribe those
acquisitions in which "in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect. . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."' 36 The modification of the phrase referring to the relevant geographic market is of interest: "in any section or
community" in the original Act was changed to read "in any section of
the country." 137 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recommended
deletion of the word "community" because it might be interpreted as
preventing "any local enterprise in a small town from buying up another local enterprise in the same town."' 38 The House Committee on
the Judiciary approached the matter differently, interpreting not what
the old Act might have provided but rather what the revised wording
did provide:
The test of substantial lessening of competition or tending to
create a monopoly is not intended to be applicable only where the
specified effect may appear on a Nation-wide or industry-wide scale.
in each line of comThe purpose of the bill is to protect competition
39
merce in each section of the country.'
Thus, while it is clear that Congress sought to avoid problems associated with overly literal readings of the old Act, it is not clear
whether Congress intended by the change of terms to enlarge and-at
the same time-sharpen the focus of section 7 so as to make relevant
geographic market standards under the statute coextensive with those
of section 2. The House Report did state that the standards to be applied in adjudicating the amended section 7 were to be similar to those
40 Simithat had developed under other sections of the Clayton Act.'
larly, the Senate Report embraced the "area of effective competition"
relevant geographic market standard enunciated in the Clayton Act
section 3141 case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States (StandardStaUnited States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962) (citing 96 CONG. REC. 16,502 (1950)); see H.R. REP.

No, 1191, at 10-11.
136. Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946)).
137. Unlike the relevant geographic market phrase in the old Act, the new phrase modified
both the monopoly clause and the restraint of commerce clause. See note 129 supra. See S. REP.
No. 1775, at 5, reprintedin [19501 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4297.
138. S. REP. No. 1775, at 4, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4296 (emphasis ad-

ded). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 7 ("The Supreme Court and the Federal courts have not applied
the present strict language of section 7, even in cases of stock acquisition, so as to prevent a small
corporation from selling its business or of merging with another small business. The Supreme
Court has only applied the present language of section 7, even in the case of stock acquisitions, to
large transactions which would substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly").
139. H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8 (emphasis added).
140. Id., quoted in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962); Upshaw 456.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
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tions)*142 While it is clear that Congress intended that Clayton Act section 3 standards be applied to section 7 cases, the House and Senate
reports failed to mention the standards developed under Sherman Act
section 2. This might indicate that Congress did not intend the courts
to apply the standards developed under that Act as well. Expressio
43
unius est exciusio aterius.1
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,144 the Supreme Court conducted an extensive review of the legislative history underlying the current version of section 7.145 In comparing the fundamental purposes of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Court observed:
Congress rejected, as inappropriate to the problem it sought to remedy, the application to § 7 cases of the standards for judging the legality of business combinations adopted by the courts in dealing with
cases arising under the Sherman Act, and which may have been applied to some early cases arising under original § 7.146
This particular observation of the Court alone might be persuasive in
drawing a distinction between the relevant market standards under the
respective statutes; however, it is only persuasive to a certain extent
since it is possible that the Court was merely calling attention to the
fact that the scope of section 7 was, in general, much broader than that
of section 2. If that is the case, the Court may not have intended to
suggest that the contrast in purposes of the statutes required different
market standards. Consequently, proper analysis of possible distinctions in standards for determining relevant markets requires further examination of the 1950 legislative history.
Congress perceived the Sherman Act as inadequate to combat
those anticompetitive mergers clearly beyond the scope of the 1914 version of the Clayton Act. 147 Thus, in order to broaden the scope of section 7 to make it more effective, more flexible and proscriptive tests
were needed than those used in Sherman Act cases.148 Hence, the Senate Report on the 1950 amendment noted that "it [is] clear that the bilI
142. 337 U.S. 293 (1949), citedin S. REP. No. 1775, at 6, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 4298.
143. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979).
144. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
145. Id. at 311-23.
146. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
147. See notes 130-35 supra and accompanying text.
148. This was expressly stated in the House Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendment's antecedent in the prior Congress, H.R. REP. No. 596, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947), citedin Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 318 n.33, and reiterated in the Senate Report accompanying
H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., IstSess. (the Celler bill). S.REP. No. 1775, at 4-5, reprintedin[1950] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 4296-97, cited in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 318-19 n.33.
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is not intended to revert to the Sherman Act test."' 49 The question
arises, however, how the tests were to be fashioned in order to make
section 7 different from and more proscriptive than the Sherman Act:
Was the critical difference to be found in the judgment of the incipiency or actuality of a monopoly, using section 2 relevant geographic
market tests? Or was the crucial distinction to be additional breadth
and flexibility in relevant market delineation itself? Both possibilities
are plausible, 5 0 and indeed both are in line with the desires of Congress.
During the Senate floor debate on the bill, Senator O'Conor, the
Chairman of the committee that reported it, discussed the bill's scope
and the manner in which its goals were to be effectuated:
Had [the original Act] been rigidly interpreted, it would have had the
effect of preventing any company from buying the stock of any competitor, since the acquisition by one firm of a competitor not only
"substantially lessens" but completely eliminates the competition
which had formerly existed between them.
In the bill before us this stringent prohibition has been completely deleted. Instead of making the test of the law the effect of an
acquisition on competition between the acquired and the acquiring
companies, the proposedbill substitutes the more general test of the
generally in any line ofcommerce in any section of
effect on competition
5
the country.' 1
More simply stated, Senator O'Conor's critical "test of the law" for section 7 is the effect of the merger on competition in a relevant market.
On its face, this seems to be a mere restatement of the Sherman Act test
that Congress thought too lax. It follows, then, that if the Clayton Act
is to be given a more proscriptive interpretation than the Sherman Act,
and if the "test of the law" for section 7 is "the effect on competition in
a relevant market," the Clayton Act's goals must be effectuated through
market definition standards more flexible and probing than those of the
Sherman Act.
Subsequent to the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment,
some courts have failed to differentiate between the criteria for determining the relevant product market under the Clayton Act and the
149. S. REP. No. 1775, at 4, reprintedin[1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4296.
150. An entirely plausible interpretation could be that the underlying broad purposes of section 7 were to be effectuated solely by the liberalization of standards other than those for defining
the relevant market. Nevertheless, the fact that fulfillment of the distinctive purpose of section 7

alone does not require a different approach to the relevant market problems that developed in
section 2 cases does not foreclose further investigation into the possibility that Congress did intend
that new relevant market standards be developed. Indeed, the distinction noted by the Court
actually invites further scrutiny of this possibility.
151. 96 CONG. REc. 16,436 (1950) (remarks of Sen. O'Conor) (emphasis added).
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Sherman Act.' 52 Indeed, Congress itself did not seem to be very concerned about the uncertainty inherent in defining the phrase, "any line

of commerce," which denoted the relevant product market.153 Neither
committee report discussed the phrase at length,

54

nor was it given

more than summary treatment in the floor debates. Congress merely
acted as if any clarification would have been superfluous. It simply

cannot be determined whether or not Congress implicitly accepted the
prevailing Sherman Act relevant product market standards.
On the other hand, the phrase "any section of the country," refer-

ring to the relevant geographic market, was the subject of extended discussion. Senator Donnell attacked the inclusion of the phrase on the
ground that it was ambiguous. 55 But the Senate Report, in explaining

the phrase, at least attempted to offer some guidelines for geographic
market delineation. It cited a section 3 case 156 for the proposition that
the geographic market must cover the "area of effective competition."' 157 The House Report outlined its own set of standards for rele-

vant geographic market delineation. 158 These reports indicate that
Congress intended that market standards narrower and more flexible
than those of the Sherman Act be the avenue for effectuating the goals
of the 1950 amendment. 5 9 Congress' exclusive concern with the rele152. See text accompanying notes 67-102 supra.
153. But see S. REP. No. 1775, at 19-20 (minority views of Sen. Donnell).
154. See H.R. REP.No. 1191; S. REP. No. 1775, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
4293.
155. Most telling is the Senator's quote of Representative Celler's reaction to a similar phrase
in an almost identical bill during the previous Congress:
The phrase "to restrain commerce in any section of the country" is new phraseology. I have not heard that before in any antitrust legislation or in any Federal Trade
Commission legislation. It would give rise to all manner of questions, of controversies,
and of disputes; there would be nothing but confusion. It would mean a field day for the
lawyers. I am a lawyer and I would like to have a field day, but I do not think we should
on the floor of this House, willy-nilly pass legislation without mature reflection and deliberation, that we should not accept words that would make for confusion, words which
have not been passed upon by the courts.
95 CONG. REC. 9061 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler), quotedin S. REP.No. 1775, at 20 (minority
views of Sen. Donnell).
Nevertheless, Representative Celler later incorporated similar language into his own bill.
Apparently, he was content to leave the interpretation of any indefinite terms up to the courts.
See 95 CoNG. REc. 11,487 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Goodwin).
156. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), citedin S.
REP. No. 1775, at 6, reprintedin [1950] U.S: CODE CONG. SERV. 4298.
157. The Senate Report went on to say:
It should be noted that although the section of the country in which there may be a
lessening of competition will normally be one in which the acquired company or the
acquiring company may do business, the bill is broad enough to cope with a substantial
lessening of competition in any other section of the country as well.

S. REP.No. 1775, at 6, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 4298 (emphasis added).
158. See H.R. REP.No. 1191, at 5-6, 8-9.
159. See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
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vant geographic market indicates that the relevant geographic market
was its particular tool.
B.

Other ConsiderationsRequiring the Maintenance of Distinctions
Between Approaches to Relevant GeographicMarket
Delineation Under Section 7 and Section 2.

Several conceptual and practical considerations further reinforce
the necessity for drawing certain distinctions between the approaches to
relevant geographic market delineation under the respective statutes.
The first of these considerations arises as a result of the uncertainty that
surrounds relevant geographic market delineation under section 7. In
this regard, two Supreme Court opinions mark the limits of a spectrum,
with one end represented by Brown Shoe Co. v.161United States 60 and
the other by United States v. PabstBrewing Co.
In Brown Shoe, the Court established that geographic markets and
submarkets are appropriate only if they "'correspond to the commer62
cial realities' of the industry and [are] economically significant."'
Subsequent cases generally followed this principle until 1966, when, in
what Professor Posner characterizes as a "fit of nonsense," 163 the Court
rendered its decision in Pabst. There, the Court indicated--contrary to
its decision in Brown Shoe-that the relevant geographic market and
submarkets may be defined as narrowly or broadly as a court finds nec64
essary, without reference to any standard of "economic significance." 1
These two cases and their progeny are so dissimilar that it is difficult to ascertain the exact state of the law with respect to section 7 relevant geographic market definition. Thus, private parties cannot be
certain whether a particular merger or acquisition violates section 7 until they are dragged into court and the relevant geographic market is
determined. Ultimately, this ambiguity could needlessly stifle legal
business activities. The encroachment of these stifling effects on other
areas of the law should not be nurtured--especially in section 2 cases
where litigation could be avoided by effective self-imposed compliance
160. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
161. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).

162. 370 U.S. at 336-37 (footnote omitted).
163. R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 130.
164. This conclusion follows from the Court's statement:
[Wjhen the Government brings an action under § 7 it must, according to the language of
the statute, prove no more than. . . that the effect of [a]merger may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce "in any section
of the country.". . . The language of this section requires merely that the Government
prove the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United
States----"in any section" of the United States.

384 U.S. at 549 (emphasis in original).
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programs, the success of which could welldepend upon the presence of

an element of certainty.

65

exConsequently, the uncertainty that does
66

ist should be confined to section 7 cases as a matter of policy.'

Admittedly, it is possible to interpret Brown Shoe and Pabst as
being indicative of flexibility rather than uncertainty. Even so, certain

distinctions between the approaches to relevant geographic market definition under section 7 and section 2 should be maintained. If flex-

ibility exists, it exists in a rather perverse form. Indeed, it is a strange
type of flexibility that apparently allows the courts to use "the determi-

nation of the relevant geographic market to find markets [to] fit a finding of violation of Section 7."167 As Justice Stewart stated in his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' 68 "[t]he sole
consistency that I can find. . . in litigation under § 7 [is that] . . . the
Government always wins."' 169 Although perhaps an overstatement,

Justice Stewart's comment underscores the facts that the broad language of section 7 urges a general conclusion of illegality, and that the
courts tend to manipulate the relevant market in order to reach that

conclusion. The danger of this approach was noted by Justice Harlan
in his opinion in Brown Shoe:
If the Government were permitted to choose its "line of commerce"
it could presumably draw the market narrowly in a case that turns on
the existence vel non of monopoly power and draw it broadly when
both parties to a merger are within the same
the question is whether
170
competitive market.
This sort of flexibility, when combined with the submarket ap-

proach, could seriously detract from section 2's effectiveness as an antimonopolization statute. Since the section 7 submarket approach leads
to narrower and more numerous relevant markets, the onerous felony
165. The Supreme Court has recognized the merits of well-defined guidelines to aid businessmen in "predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the
Sherman Act." United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (commenting on the
per se rule). Accord, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977);

Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533
F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975), vacatedandremandedmem.,433 U.S. 904 (1977). See notes 166 &
171-73 infra and accompanying text.
166. Cf. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 592 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (a
merger case where the FTC emphasized the necessity for "businessmen to be able to make at least
some prediction as to the legality of their actions when formulating future market plans"); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (a merger case where the Court stated
that "unless businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence,
sound business planning is retarded"), quoted in United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F.
Supp. 1226, 1238 (C.D. Cal. 1973), afdmem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
167. J. AARTS, supra note 8, at 309.
168. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
169. Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
170. 370 U.S. at 368 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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provisions of section 2-for which there is no counterpart in section
717

-would

be applied to an increasing number of cases. Further-

more, since the section 7 case law permits more flexibility, the criminal

sanctions of section 2 would not be imposed uniformly.' 72 This would
lead the courts to be reluctant to enforce the antimonopolization provi-

which, in turn, might eventually
sions of the Sherman Act strictly,
73
erode the efficacy of the statute.
171. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
172. This result could open section 2 to an attack for unconstitutional vagueness. A complete
examination of such an argument is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, a brief outline
of the approach that might be taken is in order.
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Supreme Court stated: "The standards of
certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil
sanction for enforcement. The crime 'must be defined with appropriate definiteness.'" Id. at 515
(citation omitted). Thus, cases brought pursuant to section 2 should not be allowed as much
flexibility and uncertainty as cases brought under section 7.
Section 2 case law has not recently addressed any problems of uncertainty, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), upholding the constitutionality of
the Sherman Act in the face of a void for vagueness challenge, id. at 37-78, remains intact. Nonetheless, Nash could be reconsidered in light of two recent developments. First, since 1913, section
2 violations have been changed from misdemeanors to felonies. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)). Consequently, any uncertainty now has a more pronounced effect. But e. United States v. Jack Foley
Realty, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,678, at 72,791 (D. Md. 1977) (a section 1 price-fixing case in
which the court rejected an argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in light of
increased penalties), ajf'd,598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979). The second development that could lead
to a reevaluation of Nash is the encroachment of the more flexible and uncertain section 7 relevant geographical market standards into section 2 case law. As fewer distinctions between the two
statutes are observed, the more arbitrary will be the application of section 2, increasing the
probability that an attack for unconstitutional vagueness would succeed. Such an attack could be
thwarted by maintaining separate standards - especially with regard to the section 7 submarket
approach.
173. While flexibility and ambiguity may be the hallmarks of section 7 market analysis that
ultimately lead to the conclusion of inapplicability of section 7 relevant market standards to section 2 cases, it is important to realize that section 2 case law is not without its own ambiguities.
Significant in this respect is United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). There, the
Supreme Court was faced with an alleged violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act in several
localized metropolitan markets. 236 F. Supp. 244, 248-51 (D.R.I. 1964), afT'd, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
Ignoring the fact that a buyer in one area did not turn to another area as an alternative source of
supply, the Supreme Court held that the relevant geographic market was the entire nation:
[T]he record amply supports the conclusion that the business of providing such a service
is operated on a national level. There is national planning. The agreements we have
discussed covered activities in many States. The inspection, certification and rate-making is largely by national insurers. [One of the defendants] has a national schedule of
prices, rates, and terms, though the rates may be varied to meet local conditions. It deals
with multi-state businesses on the basis of nationwide contracts. ...
As the District Court found, the relevant market for determining whether the defendants have monopoly power is not the several local areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader national market that reflects the reality of the way in which
they built and conduct their business.
Id. at 575-76.
The difficulties with the opinion arise from the fact that the Court, while paying lip-service to
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Another problem with refusing to observe distinctions between the
section 7 and section 2 approaches to relevant geographic market delineation is that the submarket approach is inconsistent with the concept of monopolization. "Because the relevant market provides the
framework against which economic power can be measured, defining

the product and geographic markets is a threshold requirement under
§ 2."'174 The extent of economic power in the relevant market indicates

the presence or absence of a monopoly. More than one relevant geographic market would signify the existence of more than one monopoly, and vice versa. A single monopoly cannot be defined by several

relevant geographic markets, any more than several monopolies can be
defined by a single relevant geographic market. Absolute parity between relevant geographic markets and monopolies must exist. Use of
the submarket approach undermines this parity since by definition a
monopoly is just as extensive as its market-not more extensive, not
less extensive. Section 7 submarket analysis has no place in section 2
case law.

An equally compelling argument can be made that the market definition criteria of section 2 do not belong in section 7 cases. At least
one court has accepted such an argument in the context of defining
175
relevant product market. In United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,
the district court found that the section 2 relevant product market crite"economic significance," totally disregarded the customer-supplier relationships. As Mr. Justice
Fortas stated in his dissenting opinion:
The central issue is where does a potential buyer look for potential suppliers of the service-what is the geographical area in which the buyer has, or, in the absence of monopoly, would have, a real choice as to price and alternative facilities? This depends upon
the facts of the market place, taking into account such economic factors as the distance
over which supplies and services may be feasibly furnished, consistently with cost and
functional efficiency.
Id. at 589 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
The Court's failure to investigate the customer-supplier relationships, however, was inconsequential. Grinnellinvolved an obvious monopoly as judged by any standard. Indeed, as Professor
Sullivan has noted in his treatise on the subject, Grinnellsignals that administrative convenience
has perhaps become an important guide in choosing a market. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 33, § 18,
at 69-70.
Putting aside any argument supporting a theory of administrative convenience, perhaps the
opinion in Grinnell represents the state of the law with respect to the relevant geographic market
definition under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Grinnellis still frequently cited for its broadly
focused treatment of the relevant geographic market issue. See also American Football League v.
National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (an often-cited case with an approach to
the relevant geographic market issue similar to that in Grinnell).
Grinnellprobably represents an extreme in section 2 cases. But that extreme does not diverge
too far from the mainstream of section 2 analysis; section 2 market definition cases are more
consistent than those found in the section 7 case law.
174. Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 276 (5th Cir. 1978), cerl.
denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
175. 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

1182

DUKE LAW JOURNTAL

[Vol. 1979:1152

ria lacked the flexibility required for a section 7 case:
In many of the [cases cited by the defendant], the court adopted a
broader product at the request of the government. . . . Since the
Clayton Act is concerned with any line of commerce, the government
need not base its case on the narrowest possible market. Thus, when
the government is attempting to prevent a merger between two companies, the courts frequently have rejected the argument that each
company's product is in a separate market. However, nothing in
these cases precludes use of a narrower product market if that is the
"line of commerce" where competition is affected.
..The Clayton Act was intended to retard economic concentration in its incipiency . . . . Since the Clayton Act deals with
probabilities, a defendant may violate the act even though it does not
have monopoly power and even though the defendant's product still
faces substantial competition. Consequently, Sherman Act cases
should not be controlling in defining a "line of commerce" under the
Clayton Act. 176
The Mrs. Smith's court apparently believed that the submarket approach is an integral part of a section 7 action since the statute itself
indicates its applicability to "any" relevant section of the country. In
contrast, section 2's ambit is much broader since it is not "couched in
such local and pragmatic terms." 177 Thus, the stricter standards of secunable to
tion 2, if applied to section 7 cases, would render the courts
178
country.
the
of
reach many mergers in specific sections
All of these considerations take on added significance in view of
the predisposition of the courts to rely on principles established under
one statute in applying the other statute. 179 In many cases, the ultimate
market definition reached has been correct; however, the explicit reliance on standards from another line of case law could lead subsequent
courts to misinterpret the proper approach to relevant geographic market delineation. Consequently, the approaches to relevant geographic
market delineation under section 2 and section 7 should be kept distinct.
•

III.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A defendant's antitrust liability will often turn on the choice of a
relevant geographic market. Thus, the distinction to be drawn between
relevant geographic market delineation under section 2 of the Sherman
176. Id. at 229-30 (emphasis in original).
177. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,053, at 74,540 (W.D. Ky.), modified, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,186 (W.D. Ky.), modified, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,493 (W.D. Ky.

1978).
178. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
179. See notes 67-85 supra and accompanying text.
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Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act assumes critical importance. The
improper application of standards developed under one statute to a
case arising under the other statute could lead to results inconsistent
with the basic thrust of the antitrust laws. This problem is particularly
acute with respect to the submarket approach, which permits an alleged
antitrust violation to be evaluated on several geographic levels at one
time.
Unfortunately, the case law, with the exception of the Dairymen
case, provides no decisive guidance in this area. Hence, practical and
conceptual considerations, as well as the legislative history of the Clayton Act and the 1950 amendment, assume compelling significance. The
history underlying the original Clayton Act clearly reveals that Congress intended to establish a scope of review for section 7 with a more
localized focus than that available under the Sherman Act. A more
flexible and discrete approach to relevant geographic markets was one
of the primary tools Congress chose to accomplish this narrower focus.
Congress found, over time, that section 7 of the original Clayton Act
was not effectively accomplishing its whole purpose. Accordingly, it
passed the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 in an effort
to make the antimerger provisions of the Act more flexible and inclusive. The evidence indicates that Congress again depended heavily on
the new provision for delineating relevant geographic markets to accomplish this purpose. Congress' intent in this regard was not realized
until twelve years later when, in Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court
adopted the submarket approach to relevant market delineation, basing
its decision almost entirely upon the legislative history of section 7.
The hearings and the floor debate on the 1950 amendment emphasized the differences between the section 7 and section 2 approaches.
These differences arise from the special purposes of the respective statutes. While section 7 addresses the general lessening of competition
through mergers, section 2 proscribes actual monopolies. A monopoly,
by definition, must exist in one market only. It is as extensive as, and
no more extensive than, that market. There is no room for leeway and
surely there is no room for submarkets. In contrast, section 7 actions
are not bound by the conceptual framework of monopolization; simple
lessening of competition may be found to varying degrees on different
levels.
Aside from the fact that the conceptual differences between the
statutes require distinct criteria for delineating relevant geographic
markets, simple notions of fairness also compel such distinctions. Since
criminal penalties attach to section 2 violations but not to section 7
violations, fairness requires a more careful, less inclusive approach to

1184

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1979:1152

the adjudication of section 2 cases. The prosecution of section 2 cases
on the basis of section 7 submarket standards would all too often result
in a finding of illegal monopoly to which criminal penalties would attach. If no distinctions in section 2 and section 7 relevant geographic
market delineation standards are observed, the court could-and probably would-circumvent such onerous consequences by adjudicating
section 2 cases more arbitrarily, thereby creating a great deal of uncertainty. Fortunately, both uncertainty and unfairness can be avoided at
the outset simply by maintaining certain basic distinctions in the relevant geographic market definition standards of the respective statutes.
All of these conceptual, legal, and practical considerations demonstrate that certain distinctions between section 2 and section 7 relevant
geographic market delineation are inescapable. The most important of
these distinctions requires that the submarket approach be limited to
section 7 actions.
Glenn William Brown, Jr.

